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ABSTRACT Relations between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and NATO have placed more emphasis on 
cooperation than confrontation since the Cold War, and Ukraine has begun to move towards 
membership. At the popular level, on the evidence of national surveys in 2004 and 2005, NATO 
continues to be perceived as a significant threat, but in Russia and Ukraine it comes behind the United 
States (in Belarus the numbers are similar). There are few socioeconomic predictors of support for 
NATO membership that are significant across all three countries, but there are wide differences by 
region, and by attitudinal variables such as support for a market economy and for EU membership. 
The relationship between popular attitudes and foreign policy is normally a distant one; but in Ukraine 
NATO membership will require public support in a referendum, and in all three cases public attitudes 
on foreign policy issues can influence foreign policy in other ways, including the composition of 
parliamentary committees. In newly independent states whose international allegiances are still 
evolving, the associations between public opinion and foreign and security policy may often be closer 
than in the established democracies. 
 
The end of the Cold War created a security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe 
that has not yet been filled. Until 1991, two rival military alliances had dominated the 
continent: NATO, centred around the United States, and the Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation, which was dominated by the USSR. Even before the USSR itself had 
collapsed, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation had been consigned to history: the alliance 
had been renewed for 20 years in 1985, but was formally dissolved in July 1991, 
when the six remaining members signed a protocol to that effect after communist rule 
had collapsed across East-Central Europe. NATO, for its part, sought to reinvent 
itself, starting with a ‘Partnership for Peace’ that brought a number of the former 
communist countries into a more direct relationship and individual agreements with 
Russia and Ukraine. In 1999, and again in 2004, the Alliance expanded its 
membership to include former communist-ruled countries in Central Europe and three 
former republics of the USSR itself. However, although there were periodic 
references to the possibility of membership it was clear that Russia, and perhaps the 
other former Soviet republics, would remain outside the Alliance for the foreseeable 
future, and that relations between them would be conducted through a network of 
consultative forums of which the NATO Russia Council became the most important 
after its establishment in May 2002. 
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The nature of the post-Cold War security relationship was a function of geopolitical 
weight, wider international circumstances, leadership initiatives and domestic political 
transformation. It was, however, also a function of each side’s perception of the 
other*of the images they constructed of each other and the lenses through which they 
viewed each other. There was no reason to doubt that each of the superpowers had 
been capable of destroying its opponent in thermonuclear war and of engaging in 
devastating, high-intensity conventional warfare. However, the possession of a 
destructive capability was not the same thing as the intention to use it; and to this 
extent the ‘threat’ was a matter of subjective judgement, and not necessarily of 
objective reality. In the early years of the new century, after years of degeneration of 
its military forces, there was even less reason to believe that a post-communist Russia 
represented a serious military danger to its western neighbours. However, from the 
Russian perspective, the Western threat was never a simply military one: it was also 
one of economy and culture. Western economic and cultural development had been 
seen for many centuries as a potential threat to Russian interests, and even to the 
existence of Russia as an independent state. Much of the opposition to the pro-
Western course of Russian foreign policy after the end of communist rule came from 
an organised Left that saw a greater community of interest in the former Soviet space; 
but it also came from nationalists of various denominations, who were concerned 
about the danger that vital Russian interests might be sacrificed for the sake of an 
illusory accommodation. 
 The other post-Soviet Slavic republics, Ukraine and Belarus, shared some if not all 
of these concerns. Upgrading and institutionalising relations with NATO might offer 
them some kind of deterrence against unwanted forms of Russian military coercion. 
Yet, few in Kyiv or Minsk believed Russia was about to attack, or could seriously be 
regarded as a threat; on the contrary, all three shared common borders, a common 
language, family ties and historical experiences. NATO, by contrast, was a product of 
the Cold War, and even afterwards it was widely perceived as promoting a kind of 
‘colonial’ relationship to the east of the continent, with newly post-communist nations 
obliged to reequip their armies from the catalogues of Western defence firms, and 
then to supply troops for NATO actions outside the territory of its member states, but 
without much hope of influencing its central decisions. The NATO air campaign in 
Serbia in 1999, and then the establishment of a protectorate in Kosovo, helped to 
reinforce sceptical and even openly hostile perceptions of NATO in the three Slavic 
republics at the same time as the Alliance was beginning its eastward expansion. 
 Yet by the time of the second round of enlargement in 2004, the formal Russia - 
NATO and Ukraine - NATO relationship had been transformed and the diplomatic 
language was one of enhanced partnership, or even would-be accession in the case of 
Ukraine. We begin with an evaluation of the nature of these official relationships to 
provide the context for our subsequent analysis of public perceptions. We recognise 
that state policy and public opinion operate in different realms, and that the former is 
not simply a reflection of the latter. At the same time, it is reasonable to postulate that 
for at least the medium term the sustainability of a particular state’s policy towards 
NATO will be influenced by broad public attitudes as well as elite opinion. NATO, 
for its part, is keen to ensure that its relations with the post-Soviet states are grounded 
over time in public understanding and even approval; if the new ties with NATO are 
no more than elite or leadership projects, their legitimacy as well as their longevity 
will remain in doubt. Our discussion of these issues draws primarily on representative 
surveys in each of the three Slavic republics conducted between 2000 and 2005, using 
a common questionnaire and a common agency. 
 
NATO and the East: Three Different Policy Paths? 
 
NATO and Russia 
 
Russia’s relationship with NATO has inevitably found it difficult to shed its Cold War 
antecedents and has been suffused with concerns about status, equality and the 
geopolitics of NATO enlargement. This has not prevented the development of quite a 
broad framework of institutionalised relations between the two sides, although the 
tantalising idea of eventual Russian membership in NATO seems to have been pushed 
beyond any foreseeable policy horizon. 
 In the late 1990s Russia had become a member of Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (when this replaced the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1997), it had a 
limited and unenthusiastic association with NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
initiative, and it was assessing the prospects for the NATO – Russia Permanent Joint 
Council (PJC) that had been set up by the Founding Act on Mutual Relations between 
Russia and NATO, signed in May 1997. NATO air strikes against Serbia in response 
to the Kosovo crisis led to the evaporation of dialogue under the PJC, which had 
failed in its purpose as the principal venue of NATO - Russia consultations in times of 
crisis, and full cooperation with NATO only resumed after September 2001, when 
President Putin expressed solidarity with the US and NATO in responding to the 
terrorist attacks against America. 
 In May 2002 the NATO - Russia Council (NRC) was formed in an attempt to move 
beyond the frustrations of the PJC. The format of this new body requires joint 
decision-making in a ‘20’ format, an arrangement that exists with no other non-
member country, based on the work of a preparatory committee that seeks to develop 
a prior consensus. The NRC, which is convened twice a year at the level of foreign 
and defence ministers, had the ulterior purpose of shifting Russian attention from the 
controversy over NATO enlargement to the exploration of a kind of partnership with 
NATO. The NRC has held out the hope of genuine collaboration based on deep and 
meaningful consultations on an expanding agenda of issues, including some regional 
political issues. Such collaboration in principle could evolve into an ‘informal alliance 
with the alliance’ or Russian ‘associate membership’ in NATO. This implies that 
Russia would gradually become a real player in significant areas of NATO decision-
making and activities, although outside the collective defence commitment of 
NATO membership.1
This scenario, however, now looks unlikely and any serious progress under the 
NRC continues to be dependent on the wider political and strategic relationship 
between NATO states and Russia and the sceptical attitude of the new NATO 
member states to any increased Russian influence on NATO decisions. The wider 
Russia - NATO relationship is anyway hampered by Russia’s sullen - though under 
President Putin not vociferous or confrontational - opposition to NATO enlargement, 
and the ingrained suspicions about NATO’s strategic intentions that prevail among 
most senior Russian officers. 
 The Russian goal through the NRC is ‘a special form of partnership and cooperation 
whereby Russia, while participating in NATO political activities, collective decision-
making and joint operations with the Alliance . . . would preserve its full sovereignty 
and strategic independence’.2 A key issue for Russia is that the NRC does not discuss 
the domestic affairs or political values of its partners. Moscow seeks pragmatic, 
instrumental cooperation with NATO on a relatively equal footing, which the NRC 
seems able to offer, and has no interest in a form of integration with NATO structures 
that could constrain its internal policies or ability to develop its strategic goals. 
 In this respect it is notable that Russia has rejected the option of developing an 
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO. This is a mechanism, first 
introduced in 2002, aimed at offering NATO’s partner states tailored support related 
to the process of their democratic transformation in fields including political and 
security policy issues, defence and military issues, and civil emergency planning. 
Russia rejects outright a relationship with NATO that has this kind of transformation 
agency built into it. 
 This restricts the scope of the NRC, but still leaves it with a role in addressing a 
variety of practical topics, which are currently discussed in some 20 NRC working 
groups, committees and expert teams.3 A major part of this practical work has been in 
the field of combating terrorism.4 The options for the interoperability of related 
NATO - Russia military activities are assisted by Russia’s signature in April 2005 of 
the NATO Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement, which regulates the 
legal status of the armed forces of both sides on each other’s territory. Russia has also 
agreed to participate in joint naval patrols set up by NATO’s Operation Active 
Endeavour – maritime cooperation to deter and protect against terrorism in the 
Mediterranean Sea. The modalities of cooperation over crisis management and 
peacekeeping are under discussion, though Russia is insistent that it will not join 
‘NATO-led’ operations and the geographical location of any possible future NRC 
peacekeeping deployment is most uncertain. During 2004 - 06 a significant number of 
Russia - NATO exercises have been held with the aim of improving military-to-
military cooperation. 
 There still remains a provisional quality to much of the dialogue, activity and 
cooperation under the NRC. Many of the NRC initiatives that are publicised serve the 
function of the ‘public diplomacy of partnership’ and are as much about trying to 
change the psychological climate between Russia and NATO as about concrete 
achievements, and this in turn reflects wider political dynamics. One possibly 
important role for the NRC is the discussion of regional security problems. Issues 
discussed include the situation in Afghanistan, Iraq, in the Balkans in the Far East and 
conflict zones in the South Caucasus. The fact that the NRC agreed on a joint 
statement on the Ukraine crisis in December 2004 suggests that it has some potential 
in responding to major ‘East - West’ controversies in Europe. Indeed, this role may 
become more important if there are new foreign and security policy differences 
between Russia and NATO states in the lead-up to Russia’s 2008 presidential 
election. 
 The Russian emphasis on its sovereignty and strategic independence - a theme 
which is reinforced by a growing national self-confidence during Putin’s second 
presidential term, buoyed up by oil and gas revenues - makes the notion of Russia’s 
eventual accession to NATO and submission to the group rules of that body appear 
most unlikely. The internal reforms Russia would need to undertake to come close to 
meeting NATO’s broad admissions criteria also seem to preclude this outcome. Soon 
after the NRC dialogue commenced Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov bluntly 
noted that ‘Russia is not keen to join NATO, very much as the alliance is not eager to 
see Russia among its members’.5
In October 2005 President Putin replied more equivocally to a query whether it was 
possible Russia would ever become a member of NATO. He observed that at the 
moment NATO was ‘undergoing certain internal changes’ and that they needed to 
‘understand what we would be joining, if this issue arises, and what tasks we would 
tackle in this organisation’.6 However, the only kind of NATO that the Russian 
leadership appears ready to even consider joining would be one that is radically 
transformed in its systems of decision-making, planning and control so that its 
emphasis shifts from collective defence to collective security and Russia could 
become a powerful insider. However, Moscow cannot and apparently does not count 
on this happening in the near to medium term. 
 
NATO and Ukraine 
 
Ukraine is the post-Soviet Slavic state with the best prospect of accession to NATO 
and the greatest official desire to achieve this objective. However, it is notable that in 
Kyiv this has been very much an elite-driven project and that NATO itself will remain 
reluctant to incorporate Ukraine unless support for NATO membership is more 
widely diffused in Ukrainian society. Even then there would be formidable challenges 
ahead for Ukraine to implement the reforms necessary to manage its entry into 
NATO.7
Ukraine acquired a special status with NATO when the two parties signed a 
‘Charter on a Distinctive Partnership’ at NATO’s Madrid Summit in July 1997. This 
remains the most extensive document Ukraine has signed with any Western 
institution, although its ‘distinctiveness’ was qualified by the fact that it was 
concluded shortly after the NATO - Russia Founding Act was signed in May 1997.8
Over the following years Ukraine developed quite an advanced and institutionalised 
relationship with NATO, which was interpreted in Brussels as reflecting a general 
intent to pursue Euro-Atlantic integration, even if it was not at all clear that the 
Ukrainian leadership was willing to accept the reforms this path entailed. Indeed, 
when Leonid Kuchma was president, the NATO - Ukraine relationship was frequently 
instrumentalised for political and geopolitical purposes - both to ameliorate Western 
responses to autocratic tendencies in Ukraine and to offset pressures from Russia. 
Moreover, those Ukrainian political parties and party leaders that supported 
cooperation with NATO tended to draw a distinction between cooperation and 
integration; they favoured the former since this left options available for economic 
links with Russia and the Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS). Integration 
was regarded as a path better pursued with the European Union, via the World Trade 
Organisation.9 This left some uncertainty, at least until Viktor Yushchenko had been 
confirmed as president at the start of 2005, about the political depth of the 
relationship. 
 The July 1997 Charter did not offer any security guarantees, but it established the 
right for Ukraine to consult NATO officially through the ‘Crisis Consultative 
Mechanism’ of the charter, if it felt there was a direct or indirect threat to its security. 
It also foresaw the development of NATO - Ukraine links in various central areas, 
including civil - military relations, democratic control of the armed forces, armaments 
cooperation and defence planning. A new forum, the NATO - Ukraine Commission 
(NUC), was formed, to enable the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and Ukrainian 
representatives to meet periodically to assess the implementation of the Charter and to 
suggest ways to improve or develop cooperation. A NATO Information and 
Documentation Centre was set up in Kyiv, and NATO also established a Military 
Liaison Mission.  
 The Kosovo conflict resulted in the Ukrainian leadership temporarily downplaying 
these ties, mostly for domestic political reasons. By March 2000, however, the North 
Atlantic Council held a session in Kyiv in its simultaneous capacity as the NUC - for 
the first time in a non-member state. Exchanges also began to take place between 
Ukraine’s National Defence Academy and the NATO Defence College and the 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) school in Germany. A 
Polish - Ukrainian Peacekeeping Battalion was formed and deployed to Kosovo - a 
unique NATO member - Ukrainian combined unit. As further proof that Ukrainian 
officials had shrugged off the effect of the Kosovo campaign, in June 2000 Ukraine 
hosted the largest exercises ever conducted by NATO forces in a post-Soviet state - 
Cooperative Partner 2000. 
 Ukraine has participated actively in Partnership of Peace exercises as well as other 
bilateral exercises with NATO member states intended to enhance NATO 
interoperability objectives. The multinational Peace Shield exercises have been 
carried out at the NATO-designated Yavoriv PfP training ground in west Ukraine 
since 1995 - although a decade later the Peace Shield-2005 exercise was held in 
Crimea in July 2005, to the protests of Russian parliamentarians. The Russian Foreign 
Ministry has also complained since Spring 2004 about a memorandum ratified by the 
Supreme Rada of Ukraine that permits NATO to move its troops to Ukrainian 
territory if ‘the alliance’s common strategy demands this’.10 Previously Ukraine was 
the first NATO Partner country to express its support for NATO’s invocation of 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in response to the attacks of 11 September 
2001. It also offered overflight rights to allied aircraft participating in the air 
campaign in Afghanistan. 
 It is uncertain, however, whether President Kuchma viewed Ukraine’s active 
participation in NATO defence activities through and beyond PfP and political 
support for NATO (and the US-led coalition in Iraq) in the ‘War on Terror’ as paving 
the way to eventual accession to NATO (as for previous NATO partners in Central 
and Eastern Europe) or just as serving the instrumental goals mentioned above and 
perhaps offering a kind of partial security guarantee. Ukraine took a further step in 
May 2002 in formally indicating its readiness to move towards full membership. 
However, this might have been part of an attempt by the Kuchma administration to 
counteract its growing political isolation in the West. 
 The option of accession to NATO was implicit in the adoption of a NATO - Ukraine 
Action Plan at the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002. An Annual 2003 
Target Plan was also proclaimed as part of a larger package; most of the specific 
actions envisaged in this plan were concerned with military issues.11 However, the 
Target Plan lacked real substance and there were serious questions about the 
intentions of the Ukrainian leadership towards it. Criticising the plan, a Ukrainian 
specialist noted ‘we can pretend to be fulfilling our plans, and the NATO partners will 
listen to our empty reports with a smile’.12 In the period to 2004 even when various 
common reform goals were discussed more seriously between Brussels and Kyiv they 
suggested an agenda of reinforcing ‘soft security’ ties - civil emergency planning, 
military - scientific cooperation, base closures and civilian control of the military – 
rather than a programme focused on the prospects for the real integration of Ukraine 
in NATO.13 
 At times Kuchma claimed he understood that reform of Ukrainian economic and 
administrative structures, as well as the armed forces, would be an essential aspect of 
any deeper process of partnership with NATO. However, little was achieved outside 
the military field to demonstrate Kuchma’s commitment to such a process. Section 1 
of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan is devoted to internal political, economic and 
informational issues. However, during Kuchma’s second term as president (1999 - 
2004) there was a regression rather than improvement in these fields.14 
 Circumstances of this kind meant that Ukraine under Kuchma was unable to achieve 
agreement with NATO on a Membership Action Plan (MAP). The MAP concept was 
created at the 1999 Washington Summit of NATO to allow declared aspirants to 
NATO membership to improve their candidacies through practical reforms, especially 
in political and economic institutions, defence capabilities and institutions, the 
security sector and legal issues. This demands the identification of milestones and an 
intrusive set of commitments under NATO scrutiny. Kuchma’s preference seemed to 
be to rely on extensive participation in PfP, on NATO dialogue, and on bilateral 
engagement programmes with NATO states to try to narrow the distinction between 
partnership and actual NATO membership, while avoiding steps that might expose 
him to further scrutiny of Ukrainian domestic political arrangements. 
 By contrast, under President Yushchenko the vision of NATO membership has 
become a primary Ukrainian foreign policy objective. Yushchenko views this as a 
matter of identity; he has described NATO as the ‘best system’ for protecting the 
‘shared values’ that link Ukraine to Europe.15 Many of the reforms envisaged by 
Yushchenko happen, probably by no coincidence, to be of the kind that would be 
specified in a MAP.16 The annual NATO-Ukraine Action Plan has been addressed 
more vigorously. Yushchenko is evidently aware that from the NATO perspective 
these plans have been a test of how far the previous episodic and unsystematic 
NATO-Ukraine dialogue will become more sustained and how far Ukraine will 
develop the necessary instruments for strengthening the media, oversight of the 
defence sector and so on. NATO officials have indicated informally that if Ukraine 
were to fight corruption, improve the rule of law, raise political responsibility and 
make progress with the Action Plan, it would be difficult to oppose renaming it a 
MAP - which would clearly place Ukraine on the path to NATO accession. 
Meanwhile, in April 2005 NATO and Ukraine launched an Intensified Dialogue 
process, which is the precursor to the creation of an individually tailored MAP.17 
In March 2006 a presidential decree established an interdepartmental commission 
on preparation for Ukraine’s entry to NATO.18 Ukraine is clearly hoping for an 
accelerated timetable through a MAP to NATO accession, which might be signalled 
at the NATO summit in Riga in November 2006. The Ukrainian Defence Minister 
claims optimistically that Ukraine ‘will be ready to join NATO at the beginning of 
2008 in terms of preparedness of the Ukrainian armed forces and the security 
sector’.19 The Ukrainian foreign minister and media have optimistically suggested a 
membership date of 2008 or 2009. However, such a date would be more realistic 
during Yushchenko’s second presidential term (2009-14), if he is re-elected.20 
 The issue of the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory at 
Sevastopol in Crimea (under an agreement that remains in force to 2017) would not 
necessarily be a obstacle to this objective as NATO considers that the presence of 
third party forces in a member state is not a problem in itself. However, the Ukrainian 
government will need to address the likelihood of anti-NATO protests in Crimea.21 At 
the same time it cannot be assured that all NATO states would favour Ukrainian 
accession to the Alliance, given the new security concerns to which this would give 
rise. Ukraine’s claim will also not look convincing if the Ukrainians’ image of NATO 
remains as negative as it is at present (see below). This is one of the main reasons why 
NATO has been reluctant to endorse the idea of a rapid timetable for Ukrainian 
accession. Many NATO officials also have a sober awareness of the size of the 
reforms Ukraine still needs to undertake to present its candidacy for NATO in a more 
convincing light, and of the effect any reforms of this kind would be likely to have on 
Ukrainian public opinion. 
 
NATO and Belarus 
 
Belarus has had a prickly and limited relationship with NATO. The Belarusian 
President Alexander Lukashenko is well remembered for his strident criticism of 
NATO in the 1990s. The cooperation of Belarus with the NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly was frozen after the constitutional referendum held in Belarus in November 
1996, which was viewed by Brussels as illegitimate. After a period of impasse in 
relations between the two sides, in May 2000 Lukashenko expressed his approval for 
a draft Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) with NATO for 2000-2001, which 
was in turn approved by NATO and began operating in 2002. Belarus expressed its 
willingness to cooperate in a variety of fields within the IPP, with the emphasis on 
non-military measures.22 In 2004 a new programme for individual partnership with 
NATO was signed. This provides the foundation at least for working relations 
between Brussels and Minsk and Lukashenko has adopted a relatively conciliatory 
tone towards NATO in the current decade. However, political tensions, which are 
reflected in the Belarusian leadership’s fears of links between the Belarusian 
opposition and Western organisations, have kept the relationship at a low ebb. 
 NATO has made clear that it has no wish to extend its special relationship with 
Russia and Ukraine to Belarus, at least under its current leadership. Russia’s positive 
view of the dialogue within the NRC has meanwhile served to mute Belarusian 
broadsides against NATO, although Minsk is not confident it can rely on Russia 
acting on its behalf in the NRC and has been careful not to close off other channels 
for cooperation. This concern has been reinforced by growing ties between NATO 
and a number of other CIS states and the fact that proposals for direct consultations 
between NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, which Belarus as a 
CSTO member state has supported, have made no progress. 
 The priority for the Lukashenko leadership has been to find a way to establish 
relations with NATO on practical security issues that would divert Western demands 
for changes in Belarusian domestic political arrangements. A recent tactic has been to 
argue that Belarus’s geographical position provides it with a crucial role in the 
protection of critical infrastructure, such as pipelines, power stations and pan-
European transport corridors, and that NATO and the Western states need cooperation 
with Belarus to secure their borders against ‘terrorists, illegal migrants, drugs and 
illegal shipments of arms, including nuclear ones’.23 This argument, however self-
serving, seems to have some effect on improving ties in a security climate in which 
NATO has focused its own attention on new challenges and threats. 
 A Belarusian detachment was assigned to take part in NATO’s Co-operative Best 
Effort-2005 exercise in June 2005 at the Yavoriv training centre of the Ukrainian 
armed forces. Belarus also agreed to take part in the PfP planning and review process 
to achieve operational compatibility between allocated Belarusian troops and unified 
NATO troops. This is intended to prepare Belarusian troops to participate in 
multinational search and rescue operations and also in humanitarian and peacekeeping 
operations.24 However, Lukashenko is uncertain whether Belarus should take the 
further step of acceding to a Status of Forces Agreement with NATO and the other 
states involved in the PfP programme. On the one hand, this would be a precondition 
for the participation of Belarusian troops in any peacekeeping operations under the 
auspices of NATO on the territory of other countries and for the organisation of 
exercises at some future point in Belarus itself. On the other hand, the Belarusian 
leadership fears any steps that might open Belarus to more influence on the part of 
Western states that are unreconciled to Lukashenko’s authoritarian rule. 
 Belarus would ideally wish a technical, practical and thoroughly apolitical 
relationship with NATO. To this effect in December 2005 a Belarusian Defence 
Ministry delegation visited NATO to consult on arrangements for an IPP between 
Belarus and NATO for 2006-07. This need for some kind of working relationship has 
become imperative as Ukraine’s prospects for accession to NATO improve-which 
would bring NATO borders to the south of Belarus as well as to the west (Poland) and 
north-west (Lithuania and Latvia). A joint statement of the Belarusian and Ukrainian 
defence ministers in November 2005 declared that if Ukraine joined NATO this 
would not affect the level of cooperation between the Belarusian and Ukrainian 
defence ministries and between the two countries in the military field.25 Lukashenko 
does not want to be forced into a relationship of exclusive geopolitical reliance on 
Russia, despite the strong military relationship between the two states. He has 
complained that Russia ‘is proceeding towards cooperation with NATO, but we are 
finding it out from the mass media’.26 
 This sense of being outflanked in relations with NATO not only by Ukraine but to 
some extent by Russia, while Belarusian relations with the EU and Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) remain testy, help to explain the 
objective proclaimed by the Belarusian military leadership soon after the 2004 NATO 
enlargement of making the border with NATO ‘a border of trust, good-neighbourly 
relations and a border for the mutual resolution of security tasks in Europe’.27 
However, even if a limited rapprochement between NATO and Belarus is possible, 
there remains a deep political gulf between the two sides. To the extent that NATO 
represents a community of values it is intolerant of authoritarianism on the European 
continent (a position reinforced by the US administration’s current focus on 
democracy promotion), and it could scarcely envisage a full-fledged partnership with 
the Lukashenko leadership under such circumstances. 
 
NATO Membership and East European Publics 
 
NATO membership, and foreign affairs in general, have not often been salient to mass 
electorates in the aftermath of Cold War confrontation. However, there have been 
occasions when the question of membership has been entirely in the hands of ordinary 
people. Spain, for instance, became a member of NATO in 1982, but the Socialist 
government that came to power later in the year had originally been opposed, and it 
was agreed that a referendum would be held at which the Spanish people would make 
the final decision. It took place in March 1986, and in the event a limited form of 
membership was confirmed, by a 53-40 per cent vote on a 59 per cent turnout. In 
Hungary, similarly, a referendum took place in November 1997 on whether the 
population wished to ‘enhance their security by joining NATO’ (the wording of the 
question itself proved controversial). In the event, only 49 per cent of the electorate 
took part, but the proposition was approved by an overwhelming 85 per cent, and the 
electoral commission ruled that the result was valid because more than 25 per cent of 
the entire electorate had given their approval. 
 In Ukraine, too, public opinion is ‘divided, passive, and not terribly concerned with 
foreign affairs’.28 The Yushchenko leadership has at the same time made it clear that 
any decision about NATO membership will have to secure the support of the 
Ukrainian people in a national referendum, even though at present there is little 
prospect of its endorsement. The opposition parties, which are strongest in Russian-
speaking areas, favour the earliest possible date for a referendum so that they can take 
advantage of this distribution of opinion; Yushchenko himself has temporised, 
indicating that a referendum should be held ‘in due course’, and nationalist opinion 
has suggested as late a date as possible so that they can have an extended opportunity 
to argue in its favour.29 Opposition deputies have meanwhile pointed out that the 
Ukrainian declaration of sovereignty of 1990 – normally considered a part of the 
constitution - contains an explicit commitment to neutrality, while the constitution 
itself prohibits the stationing of foreign troops on national territory.30 Russian 
spokesmen have for their part made clear that Ukrainian membership of NATO would 
represent a ‘colossal geopolitical shift’, and the Duma has warned in an all but 
unanimous resolution that any development of this kind would have ‘very negative 
consequences’.31 
 Public attitudes to NATO membership are important, as Caplanova et al. have 
argued, not just because of referendum requirements, ‘but also because reluctant 
members can impact negatively on the development of the organization’, and because 
an understanding of attitudes and aspirations can ‘help and inform any evaluation of 
the impact of membership’.32 And there are other, larger reasons for taking the 
domestic context into account, connected with the various ways in which the 
international system can be conceptualised. As Kostadinova has argued, a relative 
neglect of domestic political factors and their role in alliance formation has stemmed 
from the ‘domination of the neorealist approach, with its state-level assumptions’. 
Studies of Eastern Europe in particular have generally focused too heavily on national 
elites and failed to consider the ‘public support dimension’, which has led to a ‘large 
gap in the current understanding of domestic sources of advocacy for government 
defense and security policies, of which the issue of East European NATO 
membership is a particular example’.33 The ‘Almond- Lippman consensus’ certainly 
assumed that ordinary citizens - at any rate, Americans - had an ‘extremely limited’ 
grasp of international affairs, but even here it was accepted that they could become 
dominant when there was an ‘immediate threat to the normal conduct of affairs’.34 
 If there has been increasing agreement on the need to integrate domestic factors into 
the study of foreign policy formation, there has been less consensus about the key 
determinants*not perhaps surprising in exercises that have been carried out at 
different times in different countries with questionnaires that have often been 
designed for other purposes. Kostadinova is one of several who have used 
Eurobarometer data of the mid-1990s in a study of attitudes towards NATO in 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Males, it emerged, were significantly more likely to favour 
membership, all other things being equal, but age, education and residential location 
were not important.35 Caplanova et al ., using the same data in relation to the same 
countries, also found that males were more likely than females to favour membership, 
but in this case residence did make a difference: those who lived in the capital cities 
were more likely to be opposed to membership than those who lived elsewhere.36 In a 
2002 study conducted for the US government in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovakia, males were once again found to be more likely to support membership than 
females, but higher levels of education and younger age were also associated with 
higher levels of support for membership; the strongest opposition was among the 
ethnic Russian minorities in the three Baltic republics.37 
 Studies of attitudes towards NATO in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are less 
numerous, but have also yielded contradictory results. Zimmerman, in the most 
extensive study of its kind,38 used surveys conducted in the second half of the 1990s 
to examine perceptions of NATO, and of its 1999 enlargement to include three former 
members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland). Clearest, perhaps, were the contrasts between mass and elite perceptions. 
NATO expansion, at least in 1995, was ‘both far more salient and a source of greater 
concern for Russian elites than it was for mass publics’; but the public mood changed 
considerably in the aftermath of the bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999, when ‘the 
salience of, and concern about, NATO expansion was more evident among mass 
publics than it had been previously’. Perceptions of NATO and of the significance of 
its 1999 enlargement, it emerged, were closely associated with a range of other 
opinions: about the kind of economic system that respondents preferred, and about 
their views on internationalism, whether they considered the United States a threat, 
and whether they had previously been a member of the Communist Party.39 
 The socioeconomic determinants of NATO support have been considered more 
directly in a study by McAllister and White based on surveys conducted in Russia, 
Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine in the first half of 2000, after the Kosovo bombing 
campaign but before the second round of enlargement that took the Alliance into 
former Soviet territory. Across the four countries, social characteristics such as 
gender, age and education made relatively little difference, except in Ukraine, where 
younger age and higher living standards were both positively associated with support 
for membership. There were much clearer associations with a range of attitudinal 
dimensions: left - right self-placement, party family, nostalgia for the USSR, and 
support for membership of the EU. Supporters of EU membership, for instance, were 
about three times as likely as the sample as a whole to support membership of NATO, 
but those who regretted the demise of the USSR were about three times as likely to be 
opposed.40 In 2006, a Russian survey found once again that younger respondents were 
more likely than others to have a positive view of NATO, but this time it was the 
better educated, and those who lived in Moscow and St Petersburg, who were the 
most likely to see NATO as an extension of US military interests and to associate it 
with aggressive military action.41 
 
Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian Perceptions of NATO 
 
In what follows we look first of all at the security environment of the three Slavic 
republics, comparing responses obtained in 2000, 2004 and (in Russia alone) 2005.42 
We set out the evidence in Table 1; it allows several conclusions to be drawn. First of 
all, in all three countries NATO continues to be perceived as a significant threat. 
However, in Russia and Ukraine it comes behind the United States (in Belarus the 
numbers are very similar); in Russia in 2005 it comes behind China as well. At the 
other extreme, the European Union and its member countries rank as very minor 
threats, and so do the other Slavic republics in every case except Ukraine in 2000, 
when Russia was seen as an important external danger. The most important single 
finding is the extent to which in almost every case the main external threat, sometimes 
by a wide margin, is the United States-testimony to the persistence of Cold War 
attitudes, or perhaps an accurate reading of the global ambitions of its 
neoconservative administration; NATO was not normally seen as an external threat of 
the same magnitude. 
Table 1. The security environment, 2000-05 
 
Belarus Russia Ukraine 
2000 2004 2000 2004 2005 2000 2004 
Germany 24 6 15 19 7 16 6 
Iraq 35 10 24 9 20 29 24 
China 27 6 24 31 31 25 8 
NATO - 30 - 32 30 - 16 
EU countries 21 7 22 13 10 12 5 
USA 49 28 48 48 41 35 22 
Russia/Ukraine 12 5 9 6 9 22 10 
Source: authors’ surveys. The question wording was ‘Which of the following countries or organisations 
represent a threat to Belarus/Russia/Ukraine?’ The figures combine ‘serious’ and ‘some threat’ as a 
percentage of all responses to each option. The surveys in Belarus and Ukraine asked about Russia as a 
possible threat; the Russian survey asked about Ukraine. 
 
NATO, admittedly, had been demonised over the Cold War period, and in any case it 
has been changing its membership and declared priorities since 1991. To what extent 
do East European publics, more than a decade later, actually understand what NATO 
is, and what view do they take of its objectives in the rather different circumstances 
that have arisen since the end of the Cold War? We asked in this connection whether 
our various respondents could pick out the Alliance from a list of three international 
organisations, or make a suggestion of their own. About half were able to identify 
NATO as a ‘military union with Western Europe led by the United States’, a level of 
knowledge rather better than was apparent in relation to the European Union, 
although levels of knowledge had dropped somewhat in both Russia and Ukraine 
between 2000 and 2004/05 in spite of a second enlargement that had taken the 
Alliance up to the borders of both countries. However, about a quarter, across the 
three countries, had no idea, and another quarter thought it was a ‘big trading and 
economic bloc connecting Western Europe and the USA’ or else a ‘peacekeeping 
agency of the United Nations’. 
 We offered our respondents a number of possible characterisations of NATO in 
these new and rather different circumstances (Table 2). Few saw it as a ‘relic of the 
Cold War’, and substantial numbers found it hard to say. 
 
Table 2. Defining NATO, 2004-05 
 Belarus      
2004 
Russia       
2004 
Russia        
2005 
Ukraine 
2004 
NATO’s objectives  
Strengthening of international 
security 
22 17 22 31 
A platform for Western expansion 31 29 33 23 
Relic of the Cold War 16 24 19 14 
Hard to say 30 29 25 31 
(Ns) 1599 2000 2000 2000 
Source: as Table 1; column percentages. Question wording was ‘In your opinion, what are the real 
objectives of NATO?’ ‘Other’ and ‘No answer’ account for residuals. 
 
However, outside Ukraine, there was little support for the rather different self-image 
that NATO itself has been seeking to propagate - as an organisation concerned with 
all forms of security in a more dangerous international environment. By contrast, 
there were many more, generally a plurality, who saw NATO as a ‘springboard for 
Western expansion’. We asked additionally, in Russia in 2005, if NATO was a 
‘defensive’ or an ‘aggressive bloc’: more than half (53 per cent) saw it as aggressive, 
twice as many as saw it as defensive (28 per cent). The view in Ukraine was not very 
different: up to 48 per cent (in 2001) saw NATO as an ‘aggressive military bloc’, and 
no more than 25 per cent (in 2002) as a ‘defensive alliance’.43 NATO, in other words, 
is consistently seen not simply as a threat, but as an organisation that is inherently 
hostile.44 
 There was, predictably, a close association across these various measures, although 
not always in the expected direction. Not surprisingly, those who thought NATO was 
a threat of some kind were more likely than others to see it as a ‘platform for Western 
expansion’ (44 compared with 26 per cent), and vice versa. Less predictably, the more 
often our respondents identified NATO correctly, the more likely it was that they 
would perceive it as a military threat. Across the three countries, 33 per cent of those 
who identified NATO as a military union of West European and North American 
states regarded it as a threat, which was considerably more than the 21 per cent among 
those who were unable to identify it correctly. Similarly, 45 per cent of our 
respondents across the three countries who were able to identify NATO correctly 
regarded it as a platform for Western expansion, compared with just 20 per cent 
among those who were unable to do so. The better informed were not, as we might 
have expected, less apprehensive, but more so. 
 There was a more predictable association between perceptions of NATO and 
support for membership (for the moment, an entirely hypothetical option, at least in 
the case of Russia and Belarus). Overall, attitudes to the possibility of membership 
were varied, with a quarter typically in favour, a quarter neutral, a quarter against, and 
another quarter unable to offer an opinion (Table 3; the neutral option was not offered 
in earlier years). On the evidence of our Russian surveys of 2000 and 2004, in which 
identical questions were asked, there was some movement away from the possibility 
of membership; but by 2005 supporters and opponents of membership were evenly 
balanced, with neutrals 
 
Table 3. Support for NATO membership, 2004-05 
Belarus Russia Ukraine 
2000 2004 2000 2004 2005 2000 2004 
Very good 6 5 8 6 5 11 5 
Quite good 23 17 28 23 17 25 18 
Neutral - 29 - - 34 - 28 
Not very good 23 15 18 26 18 21 16 
Very bad 15 6 10 12 6 15 7 
Hard to say 32 27 32 33 20 25 26 
(Ns) 1090 1599 1940 2000 2000 1590 2000 
Source: as Table 1; column percentages. Question wording was ‘In your opinion, if 
Belarus/Russia/Ukraine became a member of NATO, would it be . . .?’ Refusals to answer account for 
residuals. 
 
more numerous than either. Neutrals were also more numerous than any other 
category in Belarus and Ukraine; it was an option, indeed, that we introduced into the 
questionnaire as a result of our pilots, in which respondents had insisted on offering a 
view that was neither for nor against rather than no view at all. Patterns of support, 
more generally, were remarkably uniform across the three countries; so too were the 
substantial proportions that were unwilling to express an opinion. 
 There were closer and more predictable associations between knowledge, threat 
perceptions and views of NATO, and support or otherwise for the principle of 
membership. Of those who thought membership desirable, only 17 per cent across the 
three countries regarded NATO as a threat, compared with 42 per cent among those 
who were opposed to membership (an intriguing 15 per cent regarded NATO as a 
threat but thought they should join all the same). Similarly, of those who supported 
NATO membership, only 21 per cent across the three countries regarded NATO as a 
springboard for Western expansion, as compared with 49 per cent among those who 
were opposed. In the next part of the paper we explore the association between 
support for NATO membership and circumstances of this kind more closely before 
turning in the final part of the paper to multivariate statistics in order to isolate the 
extent to which these various factors influence support for membership when other 
factors have been taken into account. 
 
Support for Membership and its Correlates 
 
What, then, about the socioeconomic and other characteristics that are associated with 
support for NATO membership? The evidence is mostly remarkable for its lack of 
clear patterns (see Table 4). In Belarus and Ukraine, NATO membership is more 
strongly supported by males than females, in Russia the reverse: but the differences 
are modest, not just between male and female support for membership, but also 
between the propensity of either males  
 
Table 4. Support for NATO membership by socioeconomic characteristics, 2004-05 
Belarus 2004 Russia 2005 Ukraine 2004 
Support Oppose Support Oppose Support Oppose 
Male 26 23 23 27 28 23 
Female 19 19 21 21 19 23 
Under 30 years 30 16 26 20 31 17 
60 or older 15 24 16 27 15 28 
Urban 21 22 23 24 22 24 
Rural 25 20 20 25 22 23 
Primary education 14 20 17 22 13 27 
Higher education 26 23 24 27 30 22 
Low income 25 23 20 28 18 27 
High income 14 28 29 21 36 18 
Total 22 21 22 24 22 23 
Source: As Table 1; row percentages. Question wording as in Table 4. ‘Neither’ and ‘No answer’ 
account for residuals. 
 
or females to support or oppose it. Age made more of a difference, with younger 
respondents up to twice as likely to support membership as to oppose it.45 However, 
residential location made little difference, and the effects of education were 
inconsistent - in Russia, for instance, but not elsewhere, respondents with a higher 
education were more likely to oppose membership than to support it. The effects of 
higher incomes were also inconsistent: those with a higher self-assessed income were 
more likely to support membership in Russia and Ukraine, but not in Belarus; those 
with a lower self-assessed income were more likely to support membership in Belarus 
than to oppose it, but not in Russia and Ukraine. 
If socioeconomic characteristics showed modest differences, rather wider variations 
were apparent when we considered responses by region. In Ukraine particularly, the 
importance of regional differences - even when socioeconomic circumstances have 
been taken into account - is well attested in the literature.46 It is hardly surprising that 
‘region’ should make a difference of this kind, given the geographical location and 
historical experience of each of the three countries and particularly of Ukraine, 
different parts of which have come under different jurisdictions within the historical 
memory of the current electorate. We set out these differences in Table 5, dividing 
Belarus and Ukraine into western, central and eastern regions, and Russia into its 
European and Asian parts. As Table 5 shows, western regions are strongly associated 
with support for NATO membership, in Ukraine particularly so, while eastern regions 
were almost as likely to take the opposite view. In Russia location was also important, 
although in this case there was more support for NATO membership in the Asian part 
of the country, where there was more concern about a possible Chinese threat. In each 
case the differences were statistically significant, in Ukraine and Belarus particularly 
so.47 
 
Table 5. Attitudes to NATO membership by region, 2004-05 
 Support Oppose 
Belarus 2004  
Western 31 17 
Central 25 17 
Eastern 14 27 
(N) 
 
1599  
Russia 2005  
European 19 25 
Asian 30 20 
(N) 
 
2000  
Ukraine 2004  
Western 42 8 
Right Bank 19 23 
Left Bank 16 20 
South 19 26 
East 15 36 
(N) 2000  
Source: As Table 1; row percentages. Question wording was ‘In your opinion, if 
Belarus/Russia/Ukraine became a member of NATO, would it be . . .?’; don’t knows and refusals to 
answer account for residuals. 
 
We took our analysis further by considering the association between support for 
NATO membership and a variety of other variables, relating NATO support to 
broader views about political and economic systems, party preferences, and 
membership of the European Union (Table 6). The results, taken together, show a 
much closer relationship than in the case of the socioeconomic variables we 
considered at the start of this section. In each of the three countries supporters of 
Western-style democracy were more likely to support NATO membership than to 
oppose it, while those who supported a Soviet system were more likely to take the 
opposite view. Supporters of a market-oriented party were also more likely to support 
NATO membership than to oppose it (except in Russia), while supporters of a 
communist party were more likely to oppose membership than to support it (again, 
except in Russia). Similarly, supporters of a market economy were more likely to 
support membership than to oppose it (except in Russia), while supporters of a Soviet-
style planned economy were – logically - more likely to oppose NATO membership 
than to support it. The clearest association of all was with opponents of EU 
membership, who by a margin to four to one were also opposed to NATO entry.48 
 
Explaining Support for NATO: A Multivariate Perspective 
 
In the final part of the paper we isolate the importance of these various factors in 
explaining support for NATO membership, controlling for the other factors 
 
Table 6. NATO membership and policy attitudes, 2004-05 
Belarus 2004 Russia 2005 Ukraine 2004 
Oppose Support Oppose Support Oppose Support 
Political system preferences  
Favours Western democracy 18 37 20 31 13 38 
Favours Soviet system before 
Perestroika 
 
28 11 30 20 26 12 
Political party preferences  
Supports a pro-market party 18 26 28 27 16 36 
Supports a communist party 
 
41 11 24 26 41 11 
Economic system preferences  
Favours a market economy 18 29 24 25 21 27 
Favours a Soviet-type 
economy 
 
27 14 24 20 26 19 
Foreign policy preferences  
Supports EU membership 19 33 21 32 17 34 
Opposes EU membership 43 9 40 10 48 9 
Total 21 22 24 22 23 22 
(Ns) 1599 2000 2000 
Source: As Table 1; row percentages. Question wording was ‘In your opinion, if 
Belarus/Russia/Ukraine became a member of NATO, would it be . . .?’; don’t knows and refusals to 
answer account for residuals.
that might have confounded our cross-tabulations (regional differences, for instance, 
might be partly attributable to income variations; the effects of supporting a particular 
party might be at least partly attributable to the age differences among their respective 
supporters). 
 Among these various factors, we hypothesised that support for a Western-style 
political system, for EU membership and for a market economy would each exert a 
statistically significant effect on support for NATO membership. However, since all 
three were highly interrelated, each was entered separately into the regression in order 
to eliminate any problems of multicollinearity. Furthermore, as the relationship 
between NATO support and some of these variables, in particular support for a 
Western-style political system and a market economy in the case of Belarus and 
Ukraine and support for EU membership in the case of Ukraine, appeared to be 
bidirectional,49 standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) procedures could not be 
applied. In other words, it was unclear if support for a Western-style political system, 
a market economy and EU membership predicted support for NATO membership, or 
if it was support for NATO membership that predicted it. This problem can however 
be resolved by a two-stage least-squares methodology incorporating the use of 
instrumental variables that are correlated with a respective endogenous variable, but 
uncorrelated with the stochastic disturbance term.50 Since it is difficult to find proxies 
that are highly correlated with each of the endogenous regressors but uncorrelated 
with support for NATO, we use an estimate of the mean value of each of these 
regressors conditional upon some predetermined variables.51 
 First, we individually regress ‘support for a Western-style political system’, 
‘support for a market economy’ and ‘support for EU membership’ on a number of the 
exogenous variables that determine them.52 Then we retrieve the predicted values of 
‘support for a Western-style political system’ and ‘support for a market economy’ and 
regress support for NATO on each of them and other determinants. In this way, the 
predicted values of ‘support for a Western-style political system’, ‘support for a 
market economy’ and ‘support for EU membership’ resemble the original measures, 
but are uncorrelated with the deterministic term of the second-stage regressions that 
make the final estimates consistent. Table 7 reports the results we obtained in the 
second set of OLS regression equations in the case of two-stage least squares 
estimator used and the results of OLS regression equations in all other cases. The 
choice of OLS estimator was justified on the basis of a linearity test53 and given the 
fact that the dependent variable was ordinal, scaled from 1 to 5. 
 The explanatory power of all three models, each incorporating one of three political, 
economic and foreign policy attitudes, was satisfactory, explaining between 10 and 26 
per cent of the variation in the dependent variable. Socioeconomic characteristics 
were relatively weak predictors of support for NATO membership, which was in line 
with our earlier conclusions; only geographical location appears to be a statistically 
significant predictor in all three countries. Oddly, while in Belarus and Ukraine those 
who lived in the West were strongly committed to NATO membership, in Russia 
there were higher levels of support for NATO among our Asian respondents, 
suggesting (once again) that they were more likely than others to see a Chinese 
military threat. Older people were opponents of membership in Belarus and Ukraine 
(in the third model, when support for NATO was regressed on support for EU 
membership alongside other determinants), but not in Russia, whereas those with 
higher incomes were more pro-NATO in Russia and Ukraine, but not in Belarus: 
findings that are again consistent with our cross-tabulations. Perhaps surprisingly, 
urban residents in Belarus were less likely to support NATO, a result that was 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. Being a female made a difference to the 
level of NATO support only in Ukraine, and higher education was not a significant 
predictor in any of the three countries once other factors had been taken into account. 
 Our attitudinal variables, by contrast, were generally very powerful in Belarus and 
Ukraine, although less so in Russia. In particular, support for a market economy was a 
strong predictor of support for NATO in Belarus and Ukraine, although not in Russia; 
and support for EU membership was a significant predictor of support for NATO 
across the three countries. All other determinants, including knowledge of NATO, 
seeing no threat in the Baltic countries becoming NATO members and (not) regarding 
NATO as a platform for expansion to the east, had a significant effect on explaining 
support for membership, net of other factors. And as in our bivariate analysis, 
respondents ho had a better knowledge of NATO were (for whatever reason) less 
supportive of NATO membership than their counterparts in all three countries. 
 
Table 7. Explaining support for NATO 
 
Unstandardised coefficients 
Belarus Russia Ukraine 
2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Socioeconomic 
characteristics 
 
Gender .02 .01 .05 -.03 -.04 -.04 .08a .07 .08a
Age -.001 -.002 -.01b -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -
.003a
Secondary education .02 .001 -.02 .057 .059 .053 .07 .08 .06 
Higher education .06 .02 .08 .040 .039 .021 .10 .12 .09 
City resident -.09a -.10a -.10a .005 .009 .000 .03 .02 .03 
Self-assessed living standard -.05 -.06 -.06 .09a .09a 0.83a .06a .06a .05a
Region 
 
.13b .14b .15b -.20b -.20b -.17b .08b .10b .104b
Political, economic and 
foreign policy attitudes 
 
Support for Western 
democracy 
.32b - - .021 - - .228b - -
Support for a market 
economy 
- .39b - - .030 - - .510b -
Support for EU membership 
 
- - .20b - - .17b - - .267b
Other determinants  
Knowledge of NATO .21b .21b .21b .28b .28b .23b .31b .31b .28b
Negative perception of 
NATO objectives 
-.16b -.16b -.14b -.22b -.22b -.21b -.33b -.33b -.29b
Positive perception of the 
Baltics’ membership of 
NATO 
-.30b -.30b -.33b -.30b -.29b -.27b -.35b -.35b -.33b
Constant 2.014 1.962 2.453 2.908 2.870 2.397 1.939 1.017 1.638 
Adj. R-sq. .18 .18 .18 .10 .10 .15 .22 .21 .26 
(Ns) 1560 1967 1980 
Source: as Table 1 (2004 surveys). a statistically significant at pB/0.05, b pB/0.01, both two-tailed. 
Standard errors and details of scoring may be obtained from the authors. 
 
Implications 
 
Our analysis yields a number of conclusions. In the first place, it confirms that NATO 
is unpopular across the Slavic republics of the former USSR, but less unpopular than 
the United States; equally, it confirms that there are considerable elements of 
ambiguity about any assessments of this kind. Relatively large numbers are unable to 
identify NATO, given a list of three international organisations; and, asked about the 
possibility of membership, no more than half of our respondents have a clear view 
(the other half are neutral, or undecided). Indeed, even among those who did feel able 
to support the principle of membership, there were substantial numbers who took an 
apparently inconsistent position: who believed that NATO was a threat to their 
country’s security, but wished to join it; or who found it hard to say what NATO was, 
but all the same wished their country to become a member (11 per cent of all of those 
who found it hard to identify it). 
 Looking more closely at the sources of support for membership, we found that 
standard demographic variables had little explanatory power - a result consistent with 
a great deal of the survey-based research that has emerged from other studies of the 
post-Soviet republics, and not a surprising conclusion given the rapid and far-reaching 
changes that have taken place in earnings, occupations and social status.54 Some of 
our findings, indeed, were counterintuitive: that higher education should have no 
direct effect on levels of support for membership, for instance, or that urban residence 
should reduce support for membership in Belarus, or that greater levels of knowledge 
should be associated with lower levels of support for membership - results that were 
sustained in our multivariate as well as our cross-tabulation analysis. 
 By contrast, attitudinal variables were generally very powerful predictors. Support 
for Western-style democracy, for a market economy and for membership of the 
European Union had particularly strong effects in Belarus and Ukraine, although in 
Russia only support for EU membership was significantly associated with support for 
NATO membership when other factors had been taken into account. Not surprisingly, 
support for NATO membership was lower if respondents took the view that NATO 
was first of all a springboard for Western expansion. And not surprisingly, support for 
NATO membership was higher if respondents did not believe that Baltic membership 
of NATO represented a threat to their own country. The variables that were gathered 
together in our three models, country by country, explained between 10 and 26 per 
cent of the variation in our measure of support for NATO membership - a satisfactory 
result for categorical variables of the kind with which we have been dealing. 
 Does any of this matter? Connections between public attitudes and foreign policy 
decision-making, as we noted at the outset, are typically loose and distant, and 
membership of NATO is not in any case on the political agenda in Russia or Belarus. 
In Ukraine, the issue was nominally resolved by the decision in May 2002 to seek 
membership at some future point, a decision that was incorporated into the national 
security legislation of the following year. However, the image of NATO is among the 
most potent of all that have come down to us from the time of the Cold War, which 
means within the lifetime of every member of the adult population of the countries we 
are discussing. Whether NATO is seen as an aggressive alliance that is hostile to the 
interests of its former adversaries, or an ally in a wider struggle against ‘global 
terrorism’, or just a fact of life, provides part of the context of the political process in 
each of the three countries. It is a context that informs the generalised images that 
parties and candidates put forward at elections, which in turn help to shape the 
composition of parliaments, the staffing of parliamentary committees, and the 
outcome of direct elections at the presidential level. 
 There are even closer connections between public opinion and foreign policy in 
Ukraine following the constitutional changes that were agreed at the end of 2004 and 
the election of Viktor Yushchenko to the presidency. Under the existing constitution, 
the Ukrainian parliament - re-elected in March 2006 - had the right to ‘determine the 
principles of domestic and foreign policy’. Since the constitutional changes that were 
a part of the Orange Revolution, it also has the right to approve nominations to the 
foreign and defence ministries as well as to the premiership. NATO membership 
itself, as we have seen, will require the support of the adult population in a national 
referendum, a position confirmed in the agreement of August 2006 on which the new 
Ukrainian government is based. On the evidence of our own post-election survey, 
carried out in May 2006, the vote against will be almost three to one (17 per cent in 
favour, 48 per cent against); but many are still undecided, and support varies widely 
across the country. And either way, the issue will have a direct bearing on Ukrainian 
relations with other countries, from NATO fleets in southern ports to visiting Russian 
politicians with their own agendas. In newly independent states whose international 
allegiances are still evolving, the associations between public opinion and foreign and 
security policy may sometimes be very close indeed. 
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